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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonnine Sittre contends the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea, which was based on her presentation of new evidence about the
testimony an alibi witness whose location was not known or reasonably discoverable in her DUI
case.  The State responds that, because Ms. Sittre had always maintained she had not been
driving the car, the new alibi witness might have “new evidence” but that did not amount to
“newly discovered evidence.”
The State cites no authority in support of its argument about that distinction.  In fact, the
Court of Appeals has expressly rejected that argument.  The Court of Appeals has also rejected
the State’s other argument that the admissions Ms. Sittre made during the change of plea hearing
should justify denying her motion.  Under the proper standard, her new evidence established a
just reason for her to withdraw her plea.  Furthermore, the State has failed to carry its burden to
prove that prejudice would result from granting the motion, especially since its theory of
prejudice  on  appeal  was  a  theory  the  prosecutor  refused  to  pursue  when  the  district  court
expressly asked him about it.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying Ms. Sittre’s motion to withdraw
her guilty plea and remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms.  Sittre’s  Appellant’s  Brief.   They  need  not  be  repeated  in  this  Reply  Brief,  but  are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Sittre’s pre-sentence motion
to withdraw her guilty plea.
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Sittre’s Pre-Sentence Motion To
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
A. The Court Of Appeals Has Expressly Rejected The State’s Argument That New Evidence
About An Alibi Witness Does Not Show Just Reason To Withdraw A Guilty Plea
The State does not cite any authority in support of its attempt to draw a distinction
between “new evidence” and “newly discovered evidence.”  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.8-11.)
In fact, there is no authority the State could have cited in support of that position because the
Court of Appeals has already rejected that argument. State  v.  Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 146-47
(Ct. App. 1986).  In Ames, “the state assert[ed] that the ‘newly discovered evidence is not really
new because the facts contained in the [witness’s] affidavit concerning Ames’ activities the
evening and morning of the assault were known to Ames at the time of the trial.” Id. (emphasis
omitted).   That  argument  was  erroneous  because  it  “seriously  distorts  the  first  element  of  the
Drapeau test.”1 Id. at 147.
Specifically, the Ames Court explained:  “[u]nder the state’s approach the testimony of a
newly discovered alibi witness could never be ‘newly discovered evidence’ because the
testimony would tend to corroborate facts already believed by the defendant.  The state’s
1 In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, to
demonstrate  that  newly  discovered  evidence  is  sufficient  to  justify  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  a
defendant must show:  that the evidence was unknown to the defendant at the time of the trial;
that the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; that its presentation
would probably result in an acquittal; and that the failure to identify this evidence before trial
was  not  due  to  a  lack  of  due  diligence  by  the  defendant.   A  similar  analysis  is  used  to  assess
motions to withdraw guilty pleas based on newly discovered evidence. See State v. Hocker, 115
Idaho 137, 139 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that new evidence can constitute a basis to withdraw
a guilty plea if the nature of that new evidence is established on the record); see also United
States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005) (articulating that standard for the
analogous federal rule).
4position contradicts the whole theory underlying an alibi witness.” Id.   Rather,  the  Court  of
Appeals held, the proper rule in such cases is:  “Although the content of an absent witness’
testimony may be predicted,  it  is  not  ‘known’  until  that  witness  is  contacted.   If  the  witness
cannot be contacted until after trial, the evidence is ‘newly discovered’ within the meaning of the
first element of Drapeau.” Id. (emphasis from original).
Therefore, the State’s argument in this case – that Barry’s letter might be “new
evidence,” but was not “newly discovered evidence” because his letter was consistent with the
theory of the case Ms. Sittre had articulated from the outset of this case (Resp. Br., p.8) – is
directly contrary to well-established precedent. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577-78
(Ct. App. 2007) (reaffirming and applying the rule from Ames); State v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 748,
753 (Ct. App. 1987) (same); see also State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 423, 426-27 (Ct. App. 2006)
(reaffirming, but distinguishing, the rule from Ames because the defendant in Eddins had actually
been able to contact the potential witness before trial).  Under the proper standard, Ms. Sittre’s
evidence constitutes newly discovered evidence.  While she might have been able to predict that
testimony, it was not known to her since she had not been able to talk to Barry prior to pleading
guilty, as he had disappeared immediately following the accident.  (See R., p.246.)
Indeed, as the notarized letter from Ms. Sittre’s sister reveals, Barry was a transient from
Utah, meaning there was no formal address at which to contact him.  (R., p.243.)  As such,
Ms. Sittre’s case is almost identical to Ames, where the potential alibi witness had moved out of
state without leaving a forwarding address. Ames, 112 Idaho at 147.  As in Ames, “[n]othing in
the record leads us to conclude that an exercise of due diligence would have turned up the
witness’ location.” See id.  Therefore, the substance of Barry’s potential testimony was not
known, and could not reasonably have been known, at the time Ms. Sittre decided to accept the
5plea offer made by the State.2  Ergo, as in Ames, Ms. Sittre’s new evidence about the potential
alibi witness constitutes newly discovered evidence.
The fact that Ms. Sittre presented this new evidence of a potential alibi witness’s
testimony also belies the State’s contention (see Resp. Br., p.7) that she is making a mere claim
of innocence. See State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding a district court
abused its discretion by denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in light of new evidence
which supported the defendant’s assertion of innocence); compare Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho
710, 716 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding no error in trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to withdraw a
plea because the defendant only supported his claim of innocence with inadmissible evidence
and did not demonstrate why he could not have brought that evidence forward earlier).3  In fact,
Ms. Sittre recognized she could not legitimately file a motion to withdraw her plea based on her
bare assertion alone:  “I always wanted to withdraw this guilty plea, and now I have new
evidence” to support a motion to do so.  (2/22/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-13.)  Therefore, the State’s
arguments  in  regard  to  the  sufficiency  of  Ms.  Sittre’s  evidence  to  support  her  motion  are
meritless.
2 As Ms. Sittre explained in her initial brief, Barry’s testimony was material to her case, as it
would have given her a complete alibi to the charged act.  (See App. Br. pp.7-8.)  By that same
token, it was testimony which was likely to produce an acquittal if presented to a jury. Compare
Hayes, 144 Idaho at 578-80 (determining that similar alibi evidence was material and likely to
produce and acquittal).  The State did not raise any meaningful challenges in either of these
respects in its Respondent’s Brief. Compare Caldwell, 112 Idaho at 753 (noting that “[t]he state
does not seriously contend there was a failure to meet this standard” in regard to the due
diligence requirement).
3 Barry’s potential testimony was not known until he wrote his letter seven months after the
change of plea hearing (see R., p.246), and, as discussed supra, Ms. Sittre could not reasonably
have located him prior to that point.  Additionally, if Barry could not be made available to give
testimony about the relevant events, as trial counsel indicated he could (3/14/16 Tr., p.36, L.10),
his  statements  to  Ms.  Sittre  and  her  sister  would  be  admissible  as  a  statement  against  interest
under I.R.E. 804(b)(3).  (See App. Br., p.7 n.9.)  Therefore, neither of the two issues that existed
in Zepeda are present in Ms. Sittre’s case.
6B. Under The Proper Standard, Ms. Sittre’s Evidence About The New Alibi Witness
Constitutes A Just Reason To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
Turning to the well-established standard for granting a motion for withdrawal of a guilty
plea, Ms. Sittre’s new evidence presents a just reason to allow withdrawal of her guilty plea. See
State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008) (reaffirming the “just reason” standard).  The State
contends  there  is  no  just  reason  to  grant  the  motion  because  of  the  admissions  Ms.  Sittre
necessarily made in the process of entering the guilty plea she now seeks to withdraw.  (See
Resp. Br., pp.6-8.)  However, that argument has also been rejected by the Court of Appeals:
“That a court may accept an otherwise valid guilty plea, even though the defendant denies
criminal intent, does not necessarily preclude the court from later allowing the defendant to
withdraw the plea.” State v. Howell, 104 Idaho 393, 396 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing I.C.R. 33(c)).
This point is actually illustrated by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Johnson.  There, the
defendant had pled guilty to soliciting the infamous crime against nature, but, prior to
sentencing, moved to withdraw that guilty plea on the basis that he had discovered new
information which would, consistent with his account from the outset of the case, tend to negate
an element of the charged offense. Johnson, 120 Idaho at 410, 412-13.  The Johnson Court
noted that, “when questioned by the court to determine whether his plea was being entered
knowing, voluntarily and intelligently, as required in I.C.R. 11(c), Johnson admitted the acts with
which he was charged in the information.” Id.  Despite those admissions, the Court of Appeals
determined “the lesser ‘just reason’ standard for withdrawal of the plea applies” to his ensuing
presentence motion to withdraw that plea based on his denial of the charged conduct in light of
the newly discovered evidence. Id.  at  413-14.   Under  the  “just  reason”  standard,  the  Court  of
Appeals held that the district court had abused its discretion by not granting the motion to
withdraw his plea. Id. at 414-15.  Thus, as Johnson demonstrates, the fact that Ms. Sittre may
7have made certain admissions as part of entering her plea in the first place is not a basis upon
which  to  deny  her  subsequent  motion  to  withdraw  that  plea  based  upon  the  discovery  of  new
evidence.
That is not to say that the plea colloquy is always irrelevant to all motions to withdraw a
guilty plea; the potential relevance simply depends on the reason the defendant gives for
withdrawing that plea.  For example, when a defendant claims he should be allowed to withdraw
his plea because had not been adequately informed of the consequences of his plea prior to
entering it, but the colloquy shows the judge did, in fact, inform him of those consequences, the
district  court  could  properly  find  there  was  no  just  reason  to  allow for  withdrawal  of  the  plea.
See State v. Hansen, 120 Idaho 286, 290-91 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, in cases like Johnson
and Ms. Sittre’s, where the just reason for withdrawing the plea is the discovery of new evidence
which was not available at the time the plea was entered, nothing that happened during plea
colloquy is relevant because there is a reasonable possibility that, had the defendant had access to
the later-discovered evidence, she would have decided to not plead guilty in the first place.
See State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436-37 (Ct. App. 1994).4
Besides, the admissions upon which the State’s argument relies will exist in virtually
every case where the defendant has entered a plea and then seeks to withdraw that plea.
See I.C.R. 11(c) (requiring that, before the district court can accept a guilty plea in the first place,
it must ensure the defendant’s admissions are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary);
4 In Gardner, the defendant did not remember the critical events and pled guilty primarily
because of the weight of the State’s evidence. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-37.  Similarly,
Ms. Sittre did not remember the critical events surrounding the accident and pled based on the
weight of the state’s evidence. See 5/11/15 Tr., p.21, L.5 - p.22, L.18, p.24, Ls.4-22.)  However,
she did also get the benefit of an agreement to presentence release from custody, dismissal of a
persistent violator enhancement, and a sentencing recommendation for retained jurisdiction as
part of her plea agreement.  (See 5/11/15 Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.3.)
8Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 628 (2010) (explaining that even an Alford plea5 needs  to
include an admission that there is a strong factual basis for the charge).  As such, adopting the
State’s  position  –  that  those  admissions  mean a  person  should  not  be  allowed to  withdraw her
plea – would deprive I.C.R. 33(c) of meaning, as there would be no circumstance in which a
guilty plea would be allowed to be withdrawn. Compare Ames, 112 Idaho at 146-47 (rejecting a
similar argument because, by accepting such an argument, there would never be grounds for a
withdrawal of a plea following the discovery of a new alibi witness).
Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, the proper analysis is the two-part test
which looks at whether the defendant has presented a just reason for withdrawing her plea and
whether alleging that withdrawal would prejudice the State. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485
(1993).  Under that analysis, Ms. Sittre presented newly discovered evidence which is material to
the  case  and  likely  to  produce  an  acquittal,  and  that  constitutes  a  just  reason  to  withdraw  the
guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139 n.2 (Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that
newly discovered evidence can be an adequate ground to withdraw a plea if the nature of such
evidence is established on the record).  The only remaining question, then, is whether granting
that motion would prejudice the State.
C. The State Failed To Carry Its  Burden To Prove That Allowing Ms. Sittre To Withdraw
Her Plea Based On Her Just Reason Would Cause It Prejudice
The State bears the burden to prove prejudice under the proper two-part test. Dopp, 124
Idaho at 485.  On appeal, it tried to meet that burden by pointing to the year-long delay caused
by Ms. Sittre’s failure to appear during the pretrial phase of this case.  (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)
That argument is improper for several reasons.
5 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
9First, that theory of prejudice was not raised in the district court.  In fact, the prosecutor
actually chose not to pursue that argument when the district court specifically asked him about
that issue:
THE COURT:  Do you have concerns with regard to being able to locate the
witnesses  that  gave  statements  to  the  State  with  regard  to  what  they  saw at  that
time a year ago?
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor,  I  don’t  know.  I  was trying to review the
report.  It’s not contained in the file and so I don’t -- I can’t really comment on
that.  I was trying to figure out what the facts were at the time that the case was
charged from argument today but I don’t have those reports.  I think this was
broken down and set to prepare for trial at one point in time, so I don’t have the
reports. I can’t comment on that.
(5/14/16 Tr., p.34, L.23 - p.35, L.11 (emphasis added).)
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, “appellate court review is limited to
the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017), reh’g denied (internal quotation omitted).  This is
because  “‘[i]t  is  manifestly  unfair  for  a  party  to  go  into  court  and  slumber,  as  it  were,  on  his
defense, take no exception to the ruling, present no point for the attention of the court, and seek
to prevent his defense, that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court.’”
Id. (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)) (emphasis added).  “This requirement
applies equally to all parties on appeal.” Id.  That  means  the  State’s  argument  about  the  delay
causing prejudice is not properly on appeal since it did not present an argument on that theory to
the district court, and in fact, decided not to pursue that theory when expressly asked about it.
The only argument about prejudice which was actually presented to the district court was
that Ms. Sittre should have brought up this evidence earlier.  (See 5/14/16 Tr., p. 34, L.7 - p.35,
L.14.)  However, since Ms. Sittre could not have known about that evidence until seven months
after  the  change  of  plea  hearing,  when  Barry  actually  wrote  and  sent  his  letter  to  her  (see
10
R., p.246), she could not have presented this evidence any earlier than she did.  Besides the
prosecutor’s argument is erroneous under Ames,  as  it  distorts  the  whole  analysis  of  newly
discovered evidence about a previously-unavailable alibi witness’s testimony (see Section A,
supra).   Therefore,  based  on  the  argument  it  actually  raised  to  the  district  court,  the  State  has
failed to carry its burden to prove prejudice.
Second, even considering the State’s new theory of prejudice, the State has still failed to
carry  its  burden  because  it  does  not  identify  any  way  in  which  the  delay  in  this  case  actually
impacts  its  ability  to  present  its  case.   (See generally Resp.  Br.)   It  is  not  an  uncommon
occurrence for a case to take a year or more to come to trial, and such delays do not necessarily
prejudice even the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., State v. Warwick,
123 Idaho 83, 90 (Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing cases with non-prejudicial delays spanning from
nine to fourteen months and allowing for a delay in his case of sixteen months).  Therefore, the
simple fact that a delay occurred does not inherently show prejudice to the State. See State v.
Hawkins, 115 Idaho 719, 769 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining the difference
between  speculating  that  a  witness’s  memory  might  be  impaired  due  to  the  passage  of  time,
which may not show prejudice, and actually proving the witness’s lack of ability to recall events
to the district judge by presenting the witness for the judge’s examination, which might).
Rather, the delay in this case only amounts to a mere inconvenience. See State v.
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530 (2008) (explaining that a mere inconvenience is not enough to justify
denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea).  For example, the State’s argument on appeal
completely ignores the fact that, even if one of its witness’s memories has been impacted, most
of the relevant prosecution witnesses testified at the preliminary hearing.  (See generally
12/16/14 Tr.)  There are provisions by which the State could potentially (if it is determined to be
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appropriate  to  do  so)  present  that  prior  testimony  at  a  subsequent  trial. See, e.g., State v.
Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, ___, 383 P.3d 1249, 1252-55 (2016) (discussing the propriety of using
preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of live testimony at trial when a witness has become
unavailable).  As such, even considering its new theory of prejudice raised for the first time on
appeal, the State has failed to show how the delay would actually affect its ability to present its
case.   Therefore, it failed to carry its burden to prove prejudice.
Since  the  State  failed  to  carry  its  burden  to  show  that  prejudice  would  result  from
granting Ms. Sittre’s motion to withdraw her plea, this Court should reverse the order denying
that motion because that motion presented a just reason to allow Ms. Sittre to withdraw her plea
– the new discovery of alibi witness testimony.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Sittre respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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